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Conscientious Objection to Public Education: The 
Grievance and the Remedies 
Charles E. Rice* 
"This is a quiet place," said John Fink,. an 18-year-old sen- 
ior a t  Norfolk Christian School in Norfolk, Va. "The Lord helps 
us work things out." 
The hallways of Norfolk Christian are lined with student 
lockers that have no locks. A sign a t  one entrance reads, "This 
is my Father's world." Across the street is a public school, its 
pupil ranks thinned by the growing enrollments of private 
schools like Norfolk Christian.' 
An estimated 4,804,000 children-9.8% of the total elemen- 
tary and secondary school enrollments-attended nonpublic 
schools in 1976. Of these children, 86% were enrolled in church- 
related ~chools.~ The most notable development in this area has 
been the rapid growth of so-called Christian  school^.^ "A Chris- 
tian school," said Pastor Levi Whisner, a party in one of the 
leading court cases in the area,4 "has a Bible-oriented curriculum, 
Bible standards and a Christian atmosphere, a born-again true 
Christian leadership with Bible discipline.""t these schools, 
students 
are exposed to a learning environment that is considerably more 
conservative and narrow than the environment found at  most 
older, more traditional church schools. There are absolute disci- 
* Professor of Law, Ndre Dame Law School. A.B., 1953, College of the Holy Cross; 
LL.B., 1956, Boston College; LL.M., 1959, J.S.D., 1962, New York University. . 
The author would like to thank the Institute on Law, Religion and the Family of the 
Lincoln Center for Legal Studies, Inc., 1629 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., for assis- 
tance in the research and preparation of this Article. The opinions expressed, however, 
are entirely those of the author. 
1. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1978, a t  Al, cols. 3, 5, A23, col. 1. 
2. Catholic schools accounted for approximately 65% of the nonpublic school enroll- 
ment. The Catholic share of that enrollment continues the decline it  has experienced over 
the past decade, although the rate of the decline has slowed. INFORM, May 1978, a t  4 
(published by the Center for Independent Education, Menlo Park, California); N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 25, 1978, a t  22, col. 4. 
3. According to Paul A. Kienel, executive director of the Association of Christian 
Schools International, "Two new schools are opening around the country every day." N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 28, 1978, a t  Al, col. 3. In 1976 there were approximately 5,000 such schools 
in the nation. Id. There were 106,547 nonpublic elementary and secondary schools in the 
nation in 1976. INFORM, May 1978, a t  4 (published by the Center for Independent Educa- 
tion, Menlo Park, California); N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1978, at 13, col. 3. 
4. State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). 
5. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1976, a t  41, col. 1. 
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pline, neat grooming, heavy concentration on educational basics 
and constant reiteration that, as was written in Proverbs 1:7, 
"The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge." There are 
no avant garde text books sprinkled with scatological phrases. 
There is prayer before lunch, and sometimes before math.fi 
The Christian school movement is the logical outgrowth of 
the dissatisfaction of some parents, particularly some fundamen- 
talist Baptists, with what they regard as excessive secularism in 
the public schools.' The controversy has already produced some 
definitive l i t iga t i~n,~  but much remains unsettled. On the one 
hand, public authorities contend the public school is truly neutral 
toward religion. Compulsory attendance laws and other regula- 
tions by the state of private education are seen as legitimate 
measures, pursuant to the police power, to achieve a minimal 
level of intellectual and civic competence among the young. On 
the other hand, objecting parents and pastors regard the public 
schools not as areligious and authentically neutral, but rather as 
centers for the promotion of a competing faith. That faith, 
usually called secular humanism or some variant thereof, is re- 
garded by them as destructive of the religious faith of their chil- 
dren and students. When parents withdraw their children from 
public schools, they see the state's regulation of their Christian 
schools as an effort to deprive those schools of their authentic 
Christian character. In their tactics of confrontation, they are 
much more implacable than the supporters of traditional private 
and parochial schools. 
The purpose of this Article is to examine the claims of Chris- 
tian and other parents who object to what they see as an improper 
religion of secularism in the public schools; to evaluate the reme- 
dies available to those parents; and to inquire as to how, if a t  all, 
their legitimate interests and those of the state can be reconciled. 
Unfortunately the issues involved in the public education 
and religion conflict are often obscured by a failure to consider 
public education in its historical context. In that context, reli- 
6. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1978, at Al, cols. 3, 4-5. 
7. Id. at col. 3. Racial segregation does not appear to be a major motivation in the 
founding of these schools, many of which are racially mixed. Id. at col. 4. 
8. See, e.g., Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. 
App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975); Hobolth v. Greenway, 52 Mich. App. 682,218 N.W.2d 
98 (1974). See also Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 
87 YALE L.J. 515 (1978); Annot., 82 A.L.R.3d 579 (1978) (validity of sex education pro- 
grams in public schools). 
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gious controversies over the public schools are nothing new. Nev- 
ertheless, comparatively recent, well-publicized constitutional 
decisions have certainly served to exacerbate the resentment felt 
by religiously inclined parents toward the orientation of the pub- 
lic schools. This Section will examine the historical origins of the 
conflict and the issues upon which the battlelines of the present 
controversy have been drawn. 
A. Education and Religion in Historied Perspective 
Elementary and secondary education in the United States 
was private and religious in its origin and it bore a concededly 
religious stamp for much of its history, even after the state as- 
sumed the role of educator. In the colonial period, schooling was 
essentially a function of the c h u r ~ h . ~  Where a particular religion 
was established as the official religion of the colony, as in Puritan 
New England, the church schools enlisted state support. They 
were "sectarian public schools, where the public supported a sin- 
gle established religion and where dissenters' schools were not 
allowed to function."1° The elementary school in Dutch New 
Netherland, for example, has been accurately described as "a 
public parochial school" that  never failed to teach the cate- 
chism." The main purpose of such education was to train children 
in the principles of the Dutch Reformed religion.12 When the Eng- 
lish took over that colony, the New York schools continued to be 
church-controlled, whether Dutch Reformed or Anglican.13 The 
9. The situation has been characterized as follows: 
Traditionally, organized education in the Western world was Church education. 
It could hardly be otherwise when the education of children was primarily study 
of the Word and the ways of God. Even in the Protestant countries, where there 
was a less close identification of Church and State, the basis of education was 
largely the Bible, and its chief purpose inculcation of piety. To the extent that 
the State intervened, it used its authority to further aims of the Church. 
The emigrants who came to these shores brought this view of education with 
them. Colonial schools certainly started with a religious orientation. When the 
common problems of the early settlers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony re- 
vealed the need for common schools, the object was the defeat of "one chief 
project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of the 
Scriptures." 
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213-14 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(quoting THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSEITS 47 (1648)). 
10. D. BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC S HOOLS 4 (1965). 
11. W. KILPATRICK, THE DUTCH SCHOOLS OF NEW NETHERLAND AND COLONW NEW 
YORK 38 (United States Bureau of Education, Bull. No. 13, 1912). 
12. E. CONNORS, CHURCH-STATE R LATIONSHIPS IN EDUCATION IN THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK xiii (1951). 
13. See id. a t  xiv; 3 C. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 564 
(1906). 
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first public school law in the colonies, the "ould deluder" statute 
enacted by Massachusetts in 1647, required every town of more 
than fifty householders to provide a schoolmaster to teach the 
children to read the scriptures.14 ,. 
The religious character of the schools, including those with 
public support, generally continued into the post-Revolutionary 
period.15 The Northwest Ordinance, adopted by the Continental 
Congress in 1787 for the governance of the Northwest Territory, 
reflected this when it proclaimed, "hligion, Morality, and 
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness 
of mankind, Schools and the means of education shall forever be 
en~ouraged."~"n 1795, An Act for the Encouragement of Schools 
appropriated twenty thousand pounds for the support of New 
York elementary schools including "the several charity  school^."^^ 
In New York City, most of the elementary schools were such 
church-related "Charity  school^."^^ Other examples could be 
cited to show that this was an age of sectarian public education.I9 
Interest in public education began to grow in the 1830's and 
1840'~.~O This period saw the emergence of Horace Mann as the 
- 
14. See 2 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (1950). 
15. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, for example, provided: 
As the happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation of civil 
government, essentially depend upon piety, religion and morality; and as these 
cannot be generally diffused through a community, but by the institution of the 
public worship of God, and of public instructions in piety, religion and morality: 
Therefore, to promote their happiness and to secure the good order and preserva- 
tion of their government, the people of this commonwealth have a right to invest 
their legislature with power to authorize and require, and the legislature shall, 
from time to time, authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, 
and other bodies politic, or religious societies, to make suitable provision, at 
their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the 
support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion and 
morality, in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily. 
MASS. CONS. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 3. 
16. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 334, 340 (R. Hill ed. 1936) (editors 
marks deleted), reprinted in 1 Stat. 51 note (a) (1789). 
17. 1795 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 75; see also Graves, Development of the Education Law in 
New York, in 16 N.Y. EDUC. LAW (McKinney) a t  xiv (1969). 
18. See E. CONNORS, supra note 12, at xv; 6 NEW YORK STATE CONS~UTIONAL CONVEN- 
TION C O M ~  F~~~PORT 229-30 (1938). 
19. See 2 A. STOKES, supra note 14, at 52-54. 
20. One author summarized the factors that promoted this increased interest. 
Such were the popular Democratic presidential administrations (1829-1837) of 
Andrew Jackson (1767-1845); the gradual freeing of the suffrage from property 
qualifications; the large immigration of European laborers ignorant of English 
and of our democratic traditions; the rapid growth of urban industrial centers; 
and the need of providing schools in the newly settled states of the Middle West. 
These and other factors attracted national attention to the problem of education 
in the second quarter of the ninteenth century. It  was realized that the Churches 
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leading crusader for nonsectarian public schools in which the 
great "common truths" of Christianity would be taught. One 
reason for the success of his movement was the fear that, if the 
publicly supported schools remained sectarian, the growing num- 
bers of Roman Catholics would impress upon the schools the 
creed of Catholi~isrn.~~ The public or common school envisioned 
by Horace Mann was nonsectarian, but not in the same way we 
would use that term today. While the special orthodoxies of par- 
ticular creeds were excluded, the Bible was regarded as so basic 
as to be itself nonsectarian. In practice, the public schools under 
Mann's concept incorporated into their teaching a common de- 
nominator Protestantism anchored on scripture.22 
Not all Protestant denominations accepted Horace Mann's 
view of the public school, however. The Lutherans, who main- 
tained the largest.denominationa1 school system in Pennsylvania 
before the advent of public schools, supported a petition in 1834 
and privately endowed or supported institutions were entirely inadequate for the 
task. Massachusetts took the lead in the resulting movement for greatly 
strengthening the public schools and for making attendance a t  some school 
obligatory for all children of certain ages. 
2 A. STOKES, supra note 14, at 53-54. 
21. Professor Boles has elaborated as follows: 
The period from 1830 through the 1840's saw not only an increase in the number 
of Protestant sects, but an enormous influx of Roman Catholic immigrants. The 
fear that early Catholic opposition to Bible reading and other Protestant prac- 
tices in the public schools would lead to Catholic domination led to open and 
a t  times violent hostility toward Roman Catholics. Debates over the efficacy of 
Bible reading became increasingly common during this time, and the extreme 
Protestant opposition to the Catholic viewpoint finally crystallized in the Know- 
Nothing political movement which was organized officially as a party in 1853. 
During this period of strife, Horace Mann, the father of the public school system 
in America, emerged as the great crusader against sectarianism in the public 
schools. 
D. BOLES, supra note 10, at 23 (footnote omitted). 
22. As Mann explained it: 
The use of the Bible in schools is not expressly enjoined by the law, but both 
its letter and its spirit are in consonance with that use; and as a matter of fact, 
I suppose there is not, at the present time, a single town in the Commonwealth 
in whose schools it is not read. Whoever, therefore, believes in the Sacred Scrip- 
tures, has his belief, in form and in spirit, in the schools; and his children read 
and hear the words themselves which contain it. The administration of this law 
is entrusted to the local authorities in the respective toms.  By introducing the 
Bible, they introduce what all its believers hold to be the rule of faith and 
practice; and although, by excluding theological systems of human origin, they 
may exclude a peculiarity which one denomination believes to be true, they do 
but exclude what other denominations believe to be erroneous. Such is the 
present policy of our law for including what all Christians hold to be right, and 
for excluding what all, excepting some one party, hold to be wrong. 
2 A. STOKES. supra note 14, at 56 (emphasis in original). 
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calling for the repeal of the free school law. Similarly, the Mis- 
souri Synod of Lutherans insisted on the importance of denomi- 
national schools from the time of the first German immigration 
to the Midwest in the late 1 8 3 0 ' ~ . ~ ~  Strong Episcopal opposition 
to the public or Common School Movement led to a renewed 
emphasis on the establishment of Episcopal parochial schools in 
the 1840's and 1 8 5 0 ' ~ . ~ ~  The Presbyterian resistance to the Com- 
mon School Movement was even stronger. Dr. Charles Hodge, an 
influential Presbyterian leader, assailed the common schools as 
"positively anti-Christian." He declared that parochial schools 
were essential to an adequate education and that they were enti- 
tled to public funds. To deny such funds to them, he charged, was 
"unjust and tyrannical. "" 
Quite naturally, Roman Catholics opposed the generalized 
Protestant influences in the common schools. When the Common 
Council of New York City rejected the Catholic request for public 
funds for parochial schools, Bishop John Hughes launched a cam- 
paign to remove the common schools from the control of the 
Protestant-dominated Public School Society and place them 
under the control of an elected board of education which would 
run them as secular schools. In those public schools, he said, 
let religion in every shape and form be excluded. Let not the 
Protestant version of the Scriptures, Protestant forms of pray- 
ers, Protestant hymns, be forced on the children of Catholics, 
Jews, and others, as at present, in the schools for the support of 
which their parents pay taxes as well as Pre~byterians.~~ ' 
The Catholic position prevailed in the state legislature in 1842.* 
In other cities as'well, Catholics opposed the use of the King 
James Bible and other Protestant influences in the common 
schools . 2R 
The intensity of feeling aroused by this issue is difficult for 
us to appreciate at this distance. When young Tom Wall, a Cath- 
olic, refused to recite in public school from the Protestant version 
of the Bible, he was beaten by his teacher with a rattan stick for 
thirty minutes until he submitked. His punishment was upheld 
by a Boston court, which found it to be "no interference with 
See Jorgenson, The Birth of a Tradition, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, June 1963, at 407, 
Id. a t  409. 
Id. 
L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 345 (rev. ed. 1967). See generally id. at 
See 1842 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 150, 8 14. 
D. BOLES, supra note 10, at 27-29; L. PPEWER, supra note 26, at 334-36. 
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religious liberty? The distressing experience of Tom Wall dem- 
onstrates it is nothing new to claim the public schools are promot- 
ing religious beliefs contrary to the religious rights of pupils and 
their parents. 
In reaction to Catholic efforts to remove "common denomi- 
nator" Protestant influence from -the public schools, Protestant 
support for those schools increased. The resolution of the contro- 
versy in the years following the Civil War was that public funds 
would not be used for parochial schools of any denomination, but 
the public schools would retain their common denominator Chris- 
tianity with Bible reading a t  least encouraged and, if possible, 
required? This condition continued through the late nineteenth 
and the early twentieth centuries. The decades of the 1930's and 
1940's, however, saw a rise in opposition on the part of secularists 
and others to such theistic manifestations in public schools.31 In 
the 196OYs, this opposition prevailed with the elimination of 
prayer, Bible reading, and other theistic practices from public 
schools. 32 
B. Issues in the Current Conflict 
Today, Christian parents' main objections are to what they 
regard as manifestations of a secular religion in the public 
schools. Like those parents who in the past objected to Bible 
reading, some objecting parents assume that their objective is to 
keep all religious influence out of public education. To this end, 
they sometimes use the rhetoric of neutrality that was used 
against them in the recent past. It is clear, however, from the 
development of American public education, that its neutrality 
was only of a limited sort during its period of common denomina- 
tor Protestantism. Now that Supreme Court decisions have re- 
29. Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417,423 (Boston, Mass., Police Ct. 1859). 
See also Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854) (upholding the expulsion of a Catholic 
child from a public school for refusal to read in class the Protestant version of the Bible). 
30. 2 A. STOKES, supra note 14, a t  69-71; Jorgenson, supra note 23, at 413. The Blaine 
Amendment, proposed in 1875 by President Grant, reflected this solution. The Blaine 
Amendment never received the necessary two-thirds majorities in Congress and therefore 
was never referred to the states for ratification. Nevertheless, similar provisions were 
incorporated in the constitutions of 29 states between 1877 and 1917. See D. BOLES, supra 
note 10, at 30-32; 4 CONG. REC. 175, 205, 5453 (1875-1876); PROPOSED AMENDMENTS O THE 
C o ~ s n m r o ~ ,  H.R. Doc. No. 551, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1928); A. STOKES & L. PFEF- 
PER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 272 (1964); C. ZOUMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH 
LAW 75-76 (1933); Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 
939 (1951). 
31. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
32. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US.  203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
US. 421 (1962). 
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moved those Protestant manifestations from the schools, the 
question is presented whether the newly required secular atmos- 
phere is itself religious. If one concludes that it is, then the ques- 
tion arises whether a truly neutral school, in religious terms, is 
possible at  all. 
In a sense, education, like jurisprudence, is an exercise in 
"ul t i rnatol~gy."~~ At least on the elementary and secondary 
levels, every educational enterprise would seem to involve a 
choice-whether explicit or implicit-of an ultimate criterion, a 
choice of a god, as it were. This position is strongly maintained 
by some theoreticians as well as activists in the contemporary 
Christian school movement.34 If elementary and secondary educa- 
tion truly has an inherent religious character, a serious question 
is presented as to the legitimacy of state-conducted public educa- 
tion itself in light of the establishment and free exercise clauses 
of the first amendment: If education is intrinsically religious, how 
could the state's assumption of the role of educator be consistent 
with the neutrality mandate of the establishment clause as pres- 
ently interpreted? 
The immediate issue in the current controversy, however, is 
the validity of the objecting parents' claim that the public 
schools, whether or not they could ever be religiously neutral, are 
in fact now engaged in the constitutionally illicit promotion of a 
secular religion. The validity of this claim hinges upon the recent 
expansion by the Supreme Court of the constitutional definition 
of religion, for establishment clause purposes, so as to include 
nontheistic as well as theistic creeds. 
I .  Evolving first amendment concerns 
The  religion clauses of the first amendment provide 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli- 
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."35 The estab- 
lishment clause was intended to prevent the establishment by 
Congress of a favored sect, "a possibility which those states with 
establishments of their own . . . probably regarded with fully as 
much concern as those which had gotten rid of their establish- 
33. See Banett, A Lawyer Looks at Natural Law Jurisprudence, Natural Law Insti- 
tute Lecture, 1978, to be published in 23 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1978). 
34. See State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976); A. GROVER, 
OHIO'S TROJAN HORSE (1977); R. RUSHDOONY, THE MESSIANIC HARACTER OF AMERICAN 
EDUCATION (1963). 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 1, 2. 
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merits."" But the first amendment, while designed to prevent 
such an establishment by Congress, was not designed to prevent 
Congress from promoting theism and even a generalized Christi- 
anity. As Justice Joseph Story put it: 
Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and 
of the [first amendment], the general if not the universal senti- 
ment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encour- 
agement from the state so far as was not incompatible with the 
private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship 
. . . .  
The real object of the amendment was . . . to exclude all 
rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ec- 
clesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the 
exclusive patronage of the national g~vernment .~~  
The controlling mandate of the establishment clause was 
therefore neutrality among all religions. But this did not exclude 
a power in Congress to encourage belief in God or even in a gener- 
alized Christianity." The key to this meaning of establishment 
clause neutrality is the definition of religion. As originally in- 
tended in the establishment clause, "religion" connoted some 
form of a belief in God. Thus, government could be neutral as 
among all religions, so construed, while still promoting a belief in 
God. In 1890, the Supreme Court noted in dictum that "[tlhe 
term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his 
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his 
being and character, and of obedience to his will."39 This meaning 
was expressed by Chief Justice Hughes in 1931: 
The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving 
duties superior to those arising from any human relation. . . . 
One cannot speak of religious liberty, with proper appreciation 
of its essential and historic significance, without assuming the 
existence of a belief in a supreme allegiance to the will of God.1° 
36. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
3, 11-12 (1949). 
37. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, # #  1874, 
1877 (1891). 
38. Among the many illustrations of this is the fact that, on Sept. 25, 1789, the day 
after it approved the first amendment, Congress called on President Washington to pro- 
claim "a day of public thanksgiving and prayer" to acknowledge "the many signal favors 
of Almighty God." I ANNALS OF CONG. 913 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789); see C. RICE, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER 27-50 (1964). 
39. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). 
40. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissent- 
ing). 
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Under the original meaning of the establishment clause, 
therefore, nontheistic creeds were simply not religions. At the 
same time, however, atheism, agnosticism, and other nontheistic 
beliefs were fully protected by the clause protecting the free exer- 
cise of religion. An atheist was as fully entitled to the free exercise 
of his belief as was a Baptist or a Presbyterian; but the atheist 
could not complain under the establishment clause if Congress 
encouraged theistic or even Christian beliefs without preferring 
any particular sect or combination of sects. 
As time moved on, however, the American people changed. 
As Justice Brennan observed in 1963: 
[Olur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse 
people than were our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly 
among Protestant sects. Today the Nation is far more heteroge- 
neous religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not 
only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship 
according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no 
God a t  all.4' 
Today, the term "religion" in the establishment clause has 
been broadened to include nontheistic creeds. In Torcaso v. 
Watkins" in 1961, the Supreme Court, striking down a Maryland 
requirement that a state official must declare his belief in God, 
defined nontheistic beliefs as religions: 
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the 
Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to pro- 
fess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitu- 
tionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions 
as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions 
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those reli- 
gions founded on different  belief^.^" 
In a footnote to the last quoted clause, the Court stated, "Among 
religions in this country which do not teach what would com- 
monly be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddh- 
ism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others."44 
While the Torcaso holding could be explained as a tradi- 
tional free exercise clause protection of the rights of an unbeliev- 
ing aspirant to state office, the Torcaso definition of religion was 
adopted for establishment clause purposes in the 1963 case that 
41. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US. 203, 240-41 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)). 
42. 367 U S .  488 (1961). 
43. Id. at 495 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
44. Id. at 495 n.11. 
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ruled unconstitutional the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the 
reading of the Bible in public schools.45 I t  is therefore clear the 
neutrality mandate of the establishment clause requires that gov- 
ernment maintain neutrality not merely among Christian sects 
while encouraging theism or a generalized Christianity, but be- 
tween the two great classes of religions, those that acknowledge 
God and those that do not." Under this criterion, any factual 
affirmation by government of the truth of theism would be uncon- 
stitutional. Only if such affirmations are merely symbolic or cere- 
monial may they be sustained." In line with this requirement, the 
courts have generally invalidated the inclusion of prayers in the 
public school day." Theoretically, i t  would be a violation of the 
establishment clause for a teacher or other public official to af- 
firm as a fact that the Declaration of Independence is true when 
it affirms the existence of God. 
45. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 220 (1963). 
46. Incidentally, the Supreme Court's interpretation that the first amendment re- 
quires neutrality between theism and nontheism would have only a limited impact on 
public education were it not for the strict application of the Bill of Rights, including the 
first amendment religion clauses, against the states. See Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). While practically all state constitutions contained 
provisions similar to the Bill of Rights, their interpretation was originally not a federal 
question. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 135-36 (1977). Even the doctrine of 
incorporation, as first enunciated, would probably have left to the states the questions 
involved in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203 (1963), since the process formerly applied only to those protections of the 
Bill of Rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," particularly notions of due 
process. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353 (1937); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 666 (1925); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). But now, with almost all Bill 
of Rights provisions strictly applied to the states, the range of permissible state policies 
is much narrower. 
When Christian parents object to what they regard as secularistic tendencies in the 
public schools, they are therefore contending not only against the broadened mandate of 
the first amendment, which requires neutrality between theism and nontheism, but also 
against the strict incorporation doctrine under which that neutrality is fully required of 
the states and local governments. Moreover, those combined doctrines operate to restrict 
any subsidies and benefits the states might otherwise extend to private schools of a 
religious character. See Gaffney, Postscript: Meek, Wolman, and the "Fear of Imaginable 
but Totally Implausible Evils" in the Funding of Nonpublic Education, in FREEDOM AND 
EDUCATION: Pierce u. Society of Sisters RECONSIDERED 79-93 (1978). 
47. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962). In Schempp, Justice Brennan 
commented that the words "under God" in the revised Pledge of Allegiance are not 
necessarily unconstitutional because they "may merely recognize the historical fact that 
our Nation was believed to have been founded 'under God."' 374 U.S. at  304. 
48. See DeSpain v. De Kalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 '(7th Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965); State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 
564, 262 A.2d 21 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970), cert. denied, 
401 U.S. 1013 (1971). But see Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965); 
Rice, The Prayer Amendment: A Justification, 24 S.C.L. REV. 705 (1972). 
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Pursuant to this neutrality mandate, public schools must not 
only avoid prayers and other affirmations of the existence of God 
but they must maintain a less clearly defined neutrality as well 
on moral questions.4s Thus, while a course on sex education may 
constitutionally present different moral views to the pupils, it 
may not present God's law as a binding criterion and it may not 
advance any of the contradictory views as morally preferable. The 
question arises, of course, as to whether this suspension of judg- 
ment on the existence of God or on a moral issue is itself an 
implicit promotion of a secularist and relativist religion. 
The mere fact that the public school's treatment of a given 
issue happens to coincide with the tenets of a particular religion 
does not mean the school is promoting that religion. Thus, the 
Catholic Church condemns bank robbery and so does the public 
school. But that does not make the public school an instrumen- 
tality of the Vatican. Proof of the argument that the public school 
is promoting a religion of secularism requires more than a mere 
coincidence of positions between the school and the secularist 
creed. Rather, the argument depends upon whether a nonjudg- 
mental, secular treatment of an issue (abortion, for example) 
necessarily involves an affirmation, expressly or by studied exclu- 
sion, of the irrelevancy of the supernatural. It then must be asked 
whether to affirm the irrelevancy of the supernatural is necessar- 
ily to favor the position of Secular Humanism or some other secu- 
lar religion. 
2. Secular religion and the public schools 
The Supreme Court, in Torcaso u. Watkins,' properly de- 
scribed Ethical CultureS1 and Secular Humanisd2 as religions. 
49. See Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 
3d 1, 21, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 84 (1975). 
50. 367 U.S. 488, 495 & n.11 (1961). 
51. The New York Society for Ethical Culture articulated its basic philosophy: 
The Society for Ethical Culture was founded in the Spring of 1876 by Dr. Felix 
Adler. Its adherents maintain that the true test of religious consecration must 
be what men do for one another in their day-by-day living to achieve mutually 
creative and liberating relationships. Drawing inspiration and guidance from 
the great men in every age, this religious and educational fellowship, respecting 
the dignity and worth of every individual, seeks to develop ethical values in 
human relations. Without formal creed, it dedicates itself "to the ever increas- 
ing knowledge and practice and love of the right. 
See Copyright page of J. RANDALL, THE ETHICAL CHALLENGE OF A PLURALISTIC S W I ~  
(1959). 
52. Secular Humanism has been described as 
a faith in people, in all humanity, and in science as a means of attaining truth. 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 
They are similar in their effort to interpret life without reference 
to the supernatural. In this respect they are inconsistent with 
theistic religions, including the faith held by many of the Chris- 
tian parents opposed to public education today. In 1933, Human- 
ist Manifesto I, a statement of secularist beliefs, was issued by a 
group of public figures, including John Dewey, the educational 
philosopher. In 1973, an updated and similar Humanist Mani- 
festo I1 was issued by 120 religious leaders, philosophers, social 
scientists, and others." Humanist Manifesto I1 is useful here for 
its demonstration of the practical as well as theoretical inconsis- 
tency between the Humanist position and the Christian faith, 
which includes an affirmation of absolute truths derived from 
divine revelation. The manifesto proclaimed: 
We believe that traditional dogmatic or authoritarian religions 
that place revelation, God, ritual or creed above human needs 
and experience do a disservice to the human species. 
Promises of immortal salvation or fear of eternal damnation 
are both illusory and harmful. They distract humans from pres- 
ent concerns, from self-actualization and from rectifying social 
injustices. 
We affirm that moral values derive their source from 
human experience. Ethics is autonomous and situational, need- 
ing no theological or ideological sanction. Ethics stems from 
human need and interest. To deny this distorts the whole basis 
of life. 
We strive for the good life, here and now. 
. . . .  
In the area of sexuality, we believe that intolerant atti- 
tudes, often cultivated by orthodox religions and puritanical 
cultures, unduly repress sexual conduct. The right to birth con- 
It is also a quest for the ethical and spiritual values of life through philosophy, 
science, the arts, and literature. Humanists in general are not interested in 
supposedly supernatural phenomena nor in conventional religion and they are 
opposed to any form of authoritarian control. Most of them are individually 
active in expressing these ideas in some form of social action or education that 
promotes human dignity and enriches the content of life on earth. 
HUMANIST, Mar.-Apr., May-June 1962 (inside front cover). 
53. The signers included Andrei D. Sakharov, the dissident Russian physicist; Paul 
Blanshard, a leading proponent of the separation of religion from the state; Professor 
Sidney Hook of New York University; Dr. Francis Crick, the discoverer of the structure 
of the DNA molecule; Dr. Alan Guttmacher, president of the Planned Parenthood Federa- 
tion of America; Lawrence Lader, chairman of the National Association for Repeal of 
Abortion Laws; Professor B.F. Skinner of Harvard University; Jerome Nathanson, chair- 
man of the New York Society of Ethical Culture; Vashti McCollum, the plaintiff in 
McC'ollum u. Board of Educ. and former president of the American Humanist Association; 
Professor Chaim Perelman of the University of Brussels; and others. N.Y. Times, Aug. 
26, 1973, at 1, col. 3. 
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trol, abortion and divorce should be recognized. While we do not 
approve of exploitive, denigrating forms of sexual expression, 
neither do we wish to prohibit, by law or social sanction, sexual 
behavior between consenting adults. 
To enhance freedom and dignity, the individual must expe- 
rience a full range of civil liberties in all societies. This includes 
. . . a recognition of an individual's right to die with dignity, 
euthanasia and the right to suicide.54 
If the objecting parents are correct in their claim that the 
public schools are promoting the tenets of a secular religion, it 
must be on the basis that the nonjudgmental treatment of moral 
issues without any affirmation of the supernatural is itself an 
implicit assertion that contradictory moral positions are equally 
tenable, that there is therefore no objective and binding moral 
order, and that the supernatural is not a necessary factor in the 
making of moral decisions. It is not unreasonable to describe such 
teaching as an implicit affirmation of a position that, in its rela- 
tivism and secularism, is authentically religious. The Christian , 
parents' concern is therefore understandable. As Paul Blanshard, 
a signer of Humanist Manifesto 11, recently observed, 
I think that the most important factor moving us toward a 
secular society has been the educational factor. Our schools may 
not teach Johnny to read properly, but the fact that Johnny is 
in school until he is sixteen tends to lead toward the elimination 
of religious superstition. The average American child now ac- 
quires a high-school education, and this militates against Adam 
and Eve and all other myths of alleged history. . . . 
. . . When I was one of the editors of The Nation in the 
twenties, I wrote an editorial explaining that golf and intellig- 
ence were the two primary reasons that men did not attend 
Church. Perhaps I would now say golf and a high-school di- 
p10ma.~~ 
Ideas have consequences. And it is not unreasonable to con- 
clude that a steady classroom diet of suspended judgment and 
laissez faire on moral issues can influence the students' own reli- 
gious belief away from an acknowledgement of an objective law 
of God and can amount to an overall promotion of secularism. 
There is logic in the following comment by a writer in The Ameri- 
can A theist: 
And how does a god die? Quite simply because all his reli- 
gionists have been converted to another religion, and there is no 
54. Id. at 51, col. 1. 
55. Rlanshard, Three Cheers for Our Secdar State, HUMANIST, Mar.-Apr. 1976, at 17. 
8471 PUBLIC EDUCATION 861 
one left to make children believe they need him. 
Finally, it is irresistible-we must ask how we can kill the 
god of Christianity. We need only insure that our schools teach 
only secular knowledge; that they teach children to constantly 
examine and question all theories and truths put before them 
in any form; and that they teach that nothing is proven by the 
number of persons who believe a thing to be true. If we could 
achieve this, god would indeed be shortly due for a funeral serv- 
ice .56 
The point of this Article is not to attempt to prove the public 
schools are inculcating a religion of secularism, although the 
writer is strongly of the opinion they are doing just that. The 
point rather is to note the general theory and substantial charac- 
ter of the objecting parents' contentions. In light of the constitu- 
tional status of some forms of secularism as religions and in light 
of the intrinsic difficulty involved in attempting to treat sensitive 
moral issues in a nonjudgmental way, it can hardly be said that 
the parents' objections are arbitrary and irrational. 
The major concern of objecting Christian parents is the re- 
cent and substantial involvement of public schools in matters of 
family life, sex educaton, and related areas. The objectors see this 
as further evidence that the schools are really indoctrinating pup- 
ils in a secular religi~n.~' There are two remedies worth discussing 
that are directed against the education courses themselves. One 
is the excusal of students from sex education and similar classes. 
The second is the elmination of such programs from the school 
curriculum. While both of these remedies are available through 
state and local legislatures, we are concerned here with whether 
and to what extent the courts will make them available on consti- 
tutional grounds. 
Apart from those two remedies directed specifically against 
the controversial courses, three other approaches are worthy of 
consideration. The first is the introduction into the public schools 
of instruction in general, nonreligious principles of ethics and 
morality. The second is the formation of voluntary, extracurricu- 
lar religious clubs in the public schools. The third is the formation 
56. Bozarth, On Keeping God Alive, AM. ATHEIST, NOV. 1977, at 7, 8. 
57. One such objection has been articulated as follows: "The statist educators have 
indeed controlled America's future by controlling its schools; they have made the curricu- 
lum of those schools more and more openly humanistic and anti-Christian." Rushdoony, 
Introduction to A. GROVER, supra note 34, at xiv (1977). 
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of independent private schools in which the education would be 
unnencumbered by secularizing constitutional restraints. 
A. Excusal of Pupils from Sex Education and 
Similar Programs in Public Schools 
The requirements of the establishment and free exercise 
clauses "may overlap."58 On the one hand, as in the school prayer 
situation, "[wlhen the power, prestige and financial support of 
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the in- 
direct coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to 
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."5g On the other 
hand, the overlapping may occur through the granting, on reli- 
gious grounds, of an exemption from a general obligation. This 
could possibly result in a violation of establishment clause neu- 
trality through an implicit preference of the religious belief ac- 
corded the exempt i~n .~~  While a free exercise claim requires a 
showing that one is coerced in the exercise of his religi~n,~' the 
establishment clause "is violated by the enactment of laws which 
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly 
to coerce nonobserving individuals or not."62 Therefore, although 
the primary concern with respect to excusal from sex education 
is the free exercise of religion, it is necessary that solicitude for 
the individual dissident stop short of-the kind of favoritism to- 
ward his claim that would violate the establishment clause. 
The few cases in which the class excusal issue has been pre- 
sented indicate clearly that excusal will be allowed from sex edu- 
cation courses if the school authorities decide to permit it. But if 
those authorities decide to make the course compulsory, the 
courts will not interfere to require excusal. The decision to excuse 
or not, therefore, is legislative or administrative rather than judi- 
cial? 
If a program affords an opportunity for children to be ex- 
cused from the classes, the courts will reject the claim that the 
program violates the free exercise of religion and will tend to 
regard as wholly insubstantial or immaterial the claim that such 
58. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
59. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
60. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415-17 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring); 
Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.N.H. 1974); Citizens for Parental Rights v. San 
Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 18-19, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 82 (1975). 
61. Ahington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963). 
62. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). 
63. See 68 MICH. L. REV. 1050 (1970); Annot., 82 A.L.R.3d 579 (1978). 
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a voluntary program violates the establishment clause." More- 
over, the courts have not regarded favorably the claim that free 
exercise is implicitly violated by requiring the pupils to resist 
possible peer pressure in exempting themsel~es .~~  There is no 
basis in the decided cases to expect that the peer pressure on 
pupils who might want to be excused from the course will be held 
to violate their free exercise of religion." If the courts did so hold, 
however, there would be no way to eliminate that peer pressure 
by judicial action and the only recourse would seem to be to 
abolish the course, with possibly chaotic consequences for the 
curriculum. In Valent u. New Jersey State Board of Edu~a t ion ,~  
the Commissioner of Education had argued against an excusal 
requirement because "'[s]uch a precedent could open the door 
for demands for exclusion, on grounds of conscience, from such 
courses as health and physical education, biology, history and 
even English literature.'"" In Davis u. Pageag the court sustained 
the compulsory use' of audiovisual equipment over plaintiffs 
objection. In the absence of a reasonable alternative to the use of 
such equipment, the only way the state could lessen the burden 
on plaintiff's children would be "to provide separate courses of 
instruction for their children."'O The court noted that giving the 
parents the power to excuse their children would unduly disrupt 
the public school system.71 Moreover, the court ruled that 
64. See Hobolth v. Greenway, 52 Mich. App. 682, 218 N.W.2d 98 (1974); Medeiros 
v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970). 
65. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 3d 
1, 18, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 81-82 (1975). 
66. In McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), Justice Frankfurter com- 
mented on the implicit coercion of an excusal provision: 
That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not 
eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to consci- 
ence and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, and non- 
conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children. The result is an 
obvious pressure upon children to attend. 
Id. at 227 (concurring opinion). In a footnote to this passage, he further observed, "It 
deserves notice that in discussing with the relator her son's inability to get along with his 
classmates, one of his teachers suggested that 'allowing him to take the religious education 
course might help him to become a member of the group."' Id. a t  227 n.18. 
67. 114 N. J. Super. 63, 274 A.2d 832 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971), dismissed, 118 N. J. 
Super. 416, 288 A.2d 52 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972). 
68. Id. a t  68, 274 A.2d a t  835 (emphasis in original) (quoting the Commissioner's 
memorandum to the state legislative committees on education). 
69. 385 F.Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974). 
70. Id. at 401. 
71. The federal judge borrowed the words of the New Hampshire Supreme Court: 
[Tlhe power of each parent to decide the question what studies the scholars 
should pursue, or what exercises they should perform, would be a power of 
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"requiring the state to provide the children with a separate edu- 
cation conflicts with the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. "72 
Several cases have sustained compulsory sex education 
courses where objecting students were not allowed to excuse 
themselves at And no appellate case has required excusal 
from such a course. Although there is no Supreme Court decision 
directly on point, it is not likely the Court would require excusal 
if it ever decided the issue. Several Supreme Court decisions are 
instructive here. 
In West Virginia State Board of Education u. Barnette" the 
absence of an excusal system made the mandatory flag salute in 
a public school a general violation of the first amendment. But 
Barnette involved "a compulsion of students to declare a be- 
lief. "75 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an excep- 
tion, they do not now occur to 
In Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California," the 
Court held that a student at a state university could be required 
to take military training courses. Attendance at the university 
was voluntary. The Barnette Court distinguished Hamilton on 
the ground that, unlike attendance at the University of Califor- 
nia, attendance of the children at the public school "is not op- 
disorganizing the school, and practically rendering it substantially useless. 
However judicious i t  may be to consult the wishes of parents, the disintegrating 
principle of parental authority to prevent all classification and destroy all sys- 
tem in any school, public or private, is unknown to the law. Kidder v. Chellis, 
59 N.H. 473, 476 (1879). 
Id. a t  406. 
72. Id. at  401. 
73. See Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of 
Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 289 A.2d 914 (C.P. 1971). In Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. 
of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 274 A.2d 832 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971), dismissed, 118 N.J. 
Super. 416, 288 A.2d 52 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972), the trial court denied summary 
judgment to the defendants where the plaintiff parents had claimed a compulsory course 
in "Human Sexuality" violated their free exercise of religion. But the court later dismissed 
the case without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
74. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
75. Id. a t  631. 
76. Id. a t  642 (emphasis added). 
77. 293 U S .  245 (1934). 
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t i ~ n a l . " ~ ~  A more tenable di~tinction,~"owever, exists since 
Hamilton involved the state's "power to raise militia and impose 
the duties therein upon its  citizen^."^^ In effect, the military 
power of the state was sufficiently strong to permit compulsory 
military training of those who chose to attend the state univer- 
sity, while in Barnette the desire to promote patriotism was insuf- 
ficient to outweigh the general first amendment interests of the 
objectors. 
The Barnette rationale does not require excusal of pupils 
from a sex education course, however, because pupils in such a 
course are not required to declare a belief. The sex education 
course does not violate the establishment clause because it is not, 
in the view of the courts, a religious exercise. If it were religious, 
i t  would be prohibited by the establishment clause whether or not 
excusal was allowed. But given the assumption or finding that the 
sex education course is religiously neutral, mere attendance a t  
the course is clearly not a free exercise infringement of the magni- 
tude of the compulsory pledge of allegiance ruled unconstitu- 
tional in Barnette. Significantly, the Court in Barnette did not 
require that the objecting pupil be excused from the classroom, 
but only that he not be required to participate in the salute and 
pledge. 
In Sherbert u. Vernernl the Supreme Court held that a 
Seventh-day Adventist could not be denied unemployment com- 
pensation benefits because she refused, on religious grounds, to 
work on Saturdays. The regulation, said the Court, "forces her to 
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeit- 
ing benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts 
of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand."x2 The 
Court found this to be an infringement of appellant's free exercise 
of religion and held that it was not justified by a sufficiently 
compelling state interest. "It is basic that no showing merely of 
a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suf- 
fice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[olnly the 
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion 
for permissible limitation."'" Sherbert could provide an argu- 
ment that the mere requirement of sex education course atten- 
dance is an infringement of the free exercise of religion. But then 
78. 319 U.S. at 632. 
79. In his dissenting opinion in Barnette, Justice Frankfurter cogently observed that, 
while education was required by the state, attendance at the public school was indeed 
optional in light of Pierce u. Society of Sisters. Id. at 656 (Frankfurter, J. ,  dissenting). 
80. Id. at 632. 
81. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
82. Id. at 404. 
83. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
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the issue would be whether a sufficient justification exists for the 
infringement. While the Sherbert Court found the prevention of 
spurious unemployment compensation claims by pseudo- 
Sabbatarians insufficient, the Court claimed its decision was re- 
concilable with Braunfeld v. BrownJ4 There the indirect burden 
of a Sunday closing law on the religious practices of an Orthodox 
Jewish merchant was justified, according to the'sherbert Court, 
by "a strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest 
for all workers."V'he interest asserted to justify compulsory at- 
tendance a t  a sex education course is the preservation of curricu- 
lar integrity and the avoidance of the chaos that would result 
from recognition of conscientious exemption from particular 
courses. This interest in uniformity evidently will suffice to jus- 
tify the infringement on the free exercise of religion of students 
who find the course objectionable. 
I t  is clear, therefore, that school authorities will decide 
whether or not to permit objecting students to be excused from 
particular programs on account of conscientious objections. Free 
exercise claims here are appealing but they should be addressed 
to the legislature and administrative authorities rather than the 
courts. It is not difficult to imagine the confusion that would 
result from a judicial requirement of an excusal program. There 
are very few subjects in an elementary or secondary school curric- 
ulum that do not, a t  some time or another, involve an examina- 
tion of moral and even religious ideas. English, social studies, and 
science are only a few of the subjects that would provide ready 
occasions for such objections. Resolution of the conflicting claims 
between educational stability and the rights of privacy and re- 
ligion is better left to the state and local political process. 
Whether the relevant authorities choose to permit excusal from 
a course or to make the course compulsory, the courts will not 
interfere. There is no reason to expect that this situation would 
be changed by the Supreme Court of the United States were 
that  body ever to decide the issue on its merits. Thus, an at- 
tempt to use the courts to compel excusal of objecting students 
is a waste of time. Even a successful court fight would bring only 
a limited victory because concentration upon excusal from a 
specific course does not address the more basic issues of whether 
public education is permeated throughout its curriculum with 
secularist premises. 
84. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
85. 374 U.S. at 408. Cf. id. at 417 (Stewart, J., concurring in result) (arguing that 
the Sherbert holding conflicts with Rraunfeld). 
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B. Elimination of Objectionable Programs 
from the Public School Curriculum 
If the effort to use the courts to require excusal of pupils from 
particular courses is a forlorn enterprise, the more radical at- 
tempt to get the courts to remove those courses from the public 
school curriculum is utterly hopeless. One can argue cogently in 
principle that the involvement of the public schools in such mat- 
ters as family life and sex education entails a violation of the 
religious neutrality required by the establishment clause and in- 
cidentally invades the privacy rights of parents and pupils. How- 
ever, one must litigate issues in the light of decided cases. In that 
light, even though there is no direct Supreme Court holding on 
point, it is clear that such contentions will accomplish little in the 
courts today. 
One avenue of attack used by objectors is the right of pri- 
vacy. For example, in Cornwell v. State Board of Education" a 
federal district court rejected the plaintiff parents' claim that 
"they have the exclusive constitutional right to teach their chil- 
dren about sexual matters in their own homes, and that such 
exclusive right would prohibit the teaching of sex in the 
 school^."^ The court summarily noted the lack of authority in 
support of such a constitutional right, which the court thought a 
"novel propo~ition."~~ In support of the sex education program, 
the Cornwell court relied upon "the State's interest in the health 
of its ~ h i l d r e n . " ~ ~  
A similar privacy argument was unavailing in Medeiros v. 
K i y o ~ a k i . ~ ~  There the court quoted Griswold u. Connecticutg1 to 
distinguish Meyer v. Nebraskag2 and Pierce v. Society of Sistersw 
on the ground they stand for the proposition that " 'the State 
may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, 
contract the spectum of available knowledge.' "94 The court also 
ruled that the sex education program in Medeiros, unlike the pro- 
hibition of the use of contraceptives in Griswold, was not overly 
broad, particularly since parents could preview the lessons on 
86. 314 F .  Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd,  428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970). 
87. Id. at 342. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 344. 
90. 52 Haw. 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970). 
91. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
92. 262 U .S .  390 (1923). 
93. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
94. 52 Haw. at 441, 478 P.2d at 317 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
482 (1965)). 
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educational television and then request that their children be 
excused. The privacy claim was also rejected in Hopkins v. Ham- 
den Board of Edu~ation,~"here the court, in sustaining a com- 
pulsory sex education and family life course, noted that the only 
evidence offered by the plaintiffs on the privacy issue 
reflected their fear of disclosures by a child in the curriculum 
classroom discussions of private family activities or conversa- 
tions which have taken place in the home. Disclosures of this 
nature are not constitutionally protected and do not constitute 
an unlawful invasion of privacy under the fourth amendment 
. . . nor under any other law known to the court.96 
In Davis v. Pagew the parents' privacy claims were accurately 
summarized by the court. 
The interests asserted by the parents are clear. They have 
a legal, moral, and religious responsibility to protect and main- 
tain the health, welfare, and safety of their children. . . . The 
parents also want their children to follow their religious beliefs. 
Parents teach and instill in their children, from the earliest age, 
the religion that they believe will sustain and nurture them 
during life's struggles. 
The School Board's policy directly burdens this right, for it 
allows to be done in the school what is prohibited a t  home. It 
places the children between the Scylla of obeying their parents' 
religious teachings and the Charybdis of obeying the commands 
of their teachers and school authorities. The tension produced 
by this conflict cannot help but reduce the parents' effectiveness 
in directing the religious upbringing of their children and the 
School Board's effectiveness in providing the children with a 
proper e d u c a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Nevertheless, the court found "in weighing the rights and inter- 
ests of the parties, with regard to audio-visual equipment, that 
the balance tips in favor of the state."" Significantly, the conflict 
in Davis v. Page was direct and coercive: the children were re- 
quired to remain in the classroom during audiovisual presenta- 
tions forbidden by their religious beliefs.lM 
The establishment clause has been no more successful than 
95. 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 289 A.2d 914 (C.P. 1971). 
96. Id. at 416, 289 A.2d at 924. 
97. 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974). 
98. Id. at 399-400. 
99. Id. at 400. In Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 
Cal. App. 3d 1, 28-33, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 89-92 (1975), the parental privacy claim was 
rejected on the various grounds stated in Cornwell, Medeiros, and Hopkins. 
100. 385 F. Supp. at 397. 
8471 PUBLIC EDUCATION 869 
the right of privacy as a basis for attacking the validity of sex 
education and similar programs in public schools. On this issue, 
the Supreme Court decision in Epperson u. ArkansastR' may be 
controlling. There the Court said: 
The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body 
of knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the 
sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular re- 
ligious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the 
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group. 
. . . . 
There is and can be no doubt that the First Amendrqent 
does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning 
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious 
sect or dogma.1n2 
To remove sex education courses from the curriculum because 
they conflict with the religious views of some parents would not 
only be an invitation to curricular pandemonium; it would violate 
the principles enunciated in Epperson as well. 
The decisive factor here, from the standpoint of the estab- 
lishment clause, is the courts' treatment of secular publib educa- 
tion, including sex education, as authentically neutral and not 
itself  religious.'^ In Cornwell u. State Board of E d u ~ a t i o n ~ " ~  the 
court upheld a family life and sex education program "quite sim- 
ply as a public health measure."lM As the Supreme Court has 
indicated, "the State's interest in the health of its children out- 
weighs claims based upon religious freedom and the right of 
parental control."106 The description of the family life and sex 
education program as merely a "public health measure" is cru- 
cial. The court found lacking in Cornwell the sort of "overt reli- 
gious activities"lo7 that were present in the school prayer cases. 
Apparently for this reason, the court measured the program by a 
101. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
102. Id. a t  103, 106. 
103. In 1947, Justice Jackson articulated this concept: 
Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, a t  least is more consis- 
tent with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values. It is a relatively 
recent development dating from about 1840. I t  is organized on the premise that 
secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school 
can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty 
neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after the individual has been 
instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion. 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1947) (Jackson J., dissenting). 
104. 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970). 
105. Id. a t  344. 
106. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)). 
107. Id. a t  343. 
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rational basis test rather than by a compelling state interest 
standard.loR As the court said in Hopkins, 
CJnless the plaintiffs claim that a secular program was a form 
of religion, there appears to be no proof, from evaluating the 
evidence in a light most favorably [sic] to the plaintiffs, that 
the teaching of the curriculum will in fact eskablish any religious 
concept or philosophy in the school system.10Y 
The decisive point is that the courts will not assume that a-secu- 
lar program is made inherently religious by its secularity. But this 
is precisely the point raised by the constitutional recognition of 
nontheistic creeds as religions. Paradoxically, secularism is recog- 
nized as a religion110 while a secularistic treatment of basic issues 
of sex and family is considered areligious and merely a "public 
health" measure.lll I t  remains clear, however, that the courts 
today will turn a deaf ear to pleas that sex education and similar 
programs are inherently religious in nature and therefore viola- 
tive of the neutrality mandate of the establishment clause. In- 
deed, it is far more likely the courts will say that to enjoin a 
program "because it incidentally offended the religious beliefs of 
certain parents and students" would itself violate the establish- 
ment ~ 1 a u s e . I ~ ~  Prevailing court decisions offer no remedy1Izi to 
parents who desire to compel excusal of their children from 
courses to which they object and offer absolutely no hope of com- 
pelling the elimination of such courses from the curriculum. The 
key to these conclusions is the refusal by the courts to agree that 
nonjudgmental, secular courses in sex education and similar mat- 
ters are themselves religious, despite the judicial recognition that 
such secular creeds as Secular Humanism are religions in the 
constitutional sense. However, even if the Supreme Court were to 
reverse the mandate of neutrality between theism and nontheism, 
108. Id. at  342. 
109. 29 Conn. Supp. a t  411, 289 A.2d at  922 (emphasis added). 
110. The Supreme Court has said "the State may not establish a 'religion of secular- 
ism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring 
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe."' Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,314 (1952)). 
111. See Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 
3d 1, 23, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 85 (1975). 
112. Id. at  18, 124 Cal. Rptr. a t  82. 
113. Parents conceivably could raise a statutory challenge to the programs as lacking 
sufficient authorization from the legislature, a theory that is not precluded by the consti- 
tutional doctrines discussed. A claim of this sort should be one of the first remedies 
considered by counsel for objecting parents. Nevertheless, no such claim has succeeded 
at  the appellate level. See Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436, 444-47, 478 P.2d 314, 319- 
20 (1970); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 401-06, 289 A.2d 914, 
917-19 (C.P. 1971); '68 AM. JUR. 2d Schools 6 284 (1973). 
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and even if it were to relax the strict application of the Bill of 
Rights to state and local governments, the result would be of little 
help to the objecting Christian parents since courses such as sex 
educaton would then be overlaid with a veneer of common de- 
nominator theism which would satisfy no one and would activate 
the considerable energies of secularists in opposition to them. A 
similar futility would attend the restoration of "school prayer" by 
a constitutional amendment or a judicial decision reversing Engel 
v. V i t ~ l e " ~  and A bington School District u. Schempp. " T h e  phil- 
osophic confrontation over the public schools today is much too 
basic to be resolved by an attempted baptism of sex education 
courses or by a cosmetic restoration of a ritual prayer neither of 
which would address the curricular issues. 
C. Positive Remedies Within the Public School 
While there is little doubt that objecting Christian parents 
have no judicial remedies of a negative or exclusionary nature 
against what they regard as improper secularization of the public 
schools, it does not follow that such parents have no remedies at 
all within the public school. Two available remedies are worthy 
of consideration here. One is the introduction into the curriculum 
of generalized, nonsectarian instruction in morality. The other is 
the recognition of extracurricular, voluntary student clubs for the 
study and even propagation of religion. 
The starting point with respect to both of these alternatives 
is the neutrality mandate of the establishment clause. This scru- 
tiny involves the application of a three-pronged test. A program 
is constitutionally neutral only if (1) it has a secular purpose, 
(2) it has "a 'primary effect' that neither advances nor inhibits 
religions," and (3) its administration avoids "excessive govern- 
ment entanglement with religion."ll"t is important to note here 
that 
[tlhere are always risks in treating criteria discussed by the 
Court from time to time as "tests" in any limiting sense of that 
term. Constitutional adjudication does not lend itself to the 
absolutes of the physical sciences or mathematics. The stan- 
dards should rather be viewed as guidelines with which to iden- 
tify instances in which the objectives of the Religion Clauses 
have been impaired.Il7 
114. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
115. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
116. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672, 677 (19'71); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); Walz v .  Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
117. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971). 
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And, as  Justice Goldberg observed in Schempp, "great conse- 
quences can grow from small beginnings, but the measure of con- 
stitutional adjudicaton is the ability and willingness to distin- 
guish between real threat and mere ~ h a d o w . " ~ ~ W u c h  of the defi- 
nitive litigation in this area has involved statutes providing finan- 
cial aid directly or indirectly to church-related schools."!' Of 
course, those subsidy cases are distinguishable from the issue of 
teaching morality or recognizing a student religious club a t  a 
public school. Nevertheless, the general establishment clause 
principles are controlling in the elementary and secondary school 
situations as well. 
I .  Teaching morality in the public schools 
In the Schempp case, the Supreme Court recognized that 
"the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. 
Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible 
or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular 
program of education, may not be effected consistently with the 
First Amendment."120 Thus the Supreme Court has not wholly 
excluded religion from the public schools. As part of social studies 
or some other secular subject, the public school is permitted to 
teach its pupils about various religions so long as it is done non- 
judgmentally. Indoctrination, or affirmation of any particular re- 
ligious belief as true, would of course not be permitted. These 
restrictions, however, do not as clearly apply to teaching about 
morality, although there is an inherent difficulty in distinguish- 
ing morality from religion.'*' 
118. 374 U.S. at  308 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
119. See' Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U S .  349 
(1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 
1J.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. 
Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Tilton v. Richard- 
son, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court observed that "[tlhere are generally significant 
differences between the religious aspects of church-related institutions of higher learning 
and parochial elementary and secondary schools," including the reality that "college 
students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination." Id. at  
685-86 (footnote omitted). 
120. 374 U.S. at  225. 
121. In the context of conscientious objection to military service, the Supreme Court 
has held that "religious training and belief' for purposes of the Universal Military Train- 
ing and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. $456(j) (1970), encompasses 
all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a 
faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately depen- 
dent. The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief 
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the 
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory 
definition. 
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When a public school course treats controversial issues (abor- 
tion or capital punishment for example), the teachers may 
properly describe in a nonjudgmental way the various religious 
positions on the subjects. But with respect to morality, the pub- 
lic school can apparently do a certain amount of indoctrination, 
a t  least with respect to civic virtues. Thus, Justice Brennan ob- 
served in Schempp that there is a duty on the public schools to 
provide "an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heri- 
tage common to all American groups and religions. . . . This is 
a heritage neither theistic nor atheistic, but simply civic and 
pa trio ti^."'^^ TO some limited extent, it seems a public school 
teacher could carry out a mandate such as that contained in the 
California Education Code: 
Each teacher shall endeavor to impress upon the minds of the 
pupils the principles of morality, truth, justice, patriotism, and 
a true comprehension of the rights, duties, and dignity of Ameri- 
can citizenship, including kindness toward domestic pets and 
the humane treatment of living creatures, to teach them to 
avoid idleness, profanity, and falsehood, and to instruct them 
in manners and morals and the principles of a free govern- 
ment. 12:' 
These and other civic virtues may well be merely the articles of 
faith of what Will Herberg described as "America's civil re- 
l ig i~n ." '~~  Nevertheless, it appears that to a considerable extent 
the courts will permit the public schools to inculcate such pre- 
cepts of civic virtue, provided they do not carry it beyond the 
point where religious neutrality is infringed. This sort of civic 
training should not be unduly disparaged. There are some who 
see it as a major focus of public education in the wake of the 
Court decisions banning prayers and other overt religious exer- 
cises from public schools.125 A public school program of civic 
character formation would be likely to pay dividends in the re- 
duction of vandalism and in other ways. And many concerned 
theistic parents would be satisfied with the performance of that 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). See also Welsh v. United States, 398 
U.S. 333 (1970). 
122. 374 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
123. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44806 (West 1977). 
124. Herberg, America's Civil Religion: What It Is and Whence It Comes, 17 MOD. 
AGE 226 (1973). 
125. See, e.g., Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 66 Cal. App. 
3d 1, 29-35, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43,60-64 (McDaniel, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 
(1977); F. GOBLE, The Case for Character Education in A STRATEGY FOR COMMUNITIES 
(1973). 
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function by the public schools. However, the limited inquiry of 
this Article is whether the confrontation between public educa- 
tors and the militantly Christian parents who oppose them can 
be compromised by such generalized character education. In 
realistic terms, such a compromise cannot be achieved. While 
honesty, respect for the rights of others, and similar verities are 
common to "character building" and to the militantly Christian 
position, there is an irreconcilable chasm on the ultimate ques- 
tions. For example, the minimum standards for Ohio elementary 
schools which were involved in State u. Whi~ner l~~  included such 
moralisms as "'Democracy is based on such beliefs as the 
integrity of man, the dignity of the individual, equality of oppor- 
tunity, man's rationality, man's morality, man's ability to govern 
himself and to solve his problems co-operatively.' "I2' Yet the 
objecting parents rejected this sort of moralizing because it is 
"man-centered" and "places all its emphasis on the present life, 
with no provision for the teaching of an after-life."12R For those 
parents and others who object to public education as permeated 
with secular humanism, small consolidation will be offered by 
the schools' effort to teach morality in a manner that avoids 
such questions as whether God or some other is the source of 
rights and duties and whether there is an afterlife. So, to what- 
ever extent the courts allow the public schools to inculcate civic 
virtue, that remedy will be inadequate to resolve the confronta- 
tion that is the subject of this Article. 
2. Recognition of extracurricular religious clubs in public school 
It is well settled that minors are entitled to constitutional 
rights, including those protected by the first amendment and the 
right of privacy.In Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that neither "students [nor] teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression a t  the schoolhouse 
gate."I3O In upholding the right of students to wear black arm- 
bands in protest against the Vietnam War, so long as the exercise 
of their right of expression did not "materially and substantially 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school"131 the Supreme 
Court noted that "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit 
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communi- 
126. 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). 
127. A. GROVER, supra note 34, at 73 (emphasis deleted) (quoting MINIMUM STAN- 
DARDS FOR OHIO ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS $ EDb-401-03(B), at 49 (rev. ed. 1970)). 
128. A. GROVER, supra note 34, at 76. 
129. See Carey v. Population Sews. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
130. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
131. Id. at 509. 
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cate v I:E Their "permissible exercise of First Amendment rights" 
cannot be confined to "supervised and ordained discussion in a 
school classroom ."'R:s 
In Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School 
Di~ t r i c t ' :~~  public high school students sought recognition from the 
school of an extracurricular "club whose express purpose was to 
'enable those participating to know God better . . . by prayer- 
fully studying the Bible' and whose membership would be open 
only to those who 'have a genuine interest in the fulfilling of the 
purpose of this organi~ation.'"'~~ School authorities denied recog- 
nition to the club, although nonreligious clubs were recognized 
and were permitted to use classrooms and other space for club 
meetings and to publicize their activities through the school 
newspaper and bulletin boards. The court upheld the school. Rec- 
ognition, said the court, would not only give financial support to 
the club, e.g., heat, light, and a faculty sponsor, but also would 
"place school support and sponsorship behind the religious objec- 
tives of the club" and "foster excessive state entanglement with 
religion."'" Furthermore, the court felt the potential recognition 
of competing religious clubs "could engender student divisiveness 
in matters of religious beliefs."'37 
Thus, the Huntington Beach decision remains a potential 
obstacle to the availability of organized clubs as a religious influ- 
ence in the schools. The rationale of that holding, however, fails 
to adequately address significant first amendment claims having 
strong basis in existing Supreme Court precedent. It is to be 
hoped that courts confronted with future religious club recogni- 
tion cases will not blindly follow the recent California decision 
and will recognize the important protected interests of the public 
school students outlined in the discussion that follows. 
In only four cases has the Supreme Court specifically ruled 
on the merits of religious activities in the public school system. 
In McCollum v .  Board of E d u ~ a t i o n , ' ~ ~  the Court ruled that 
released-time religion classes, conducted during a regular class 
period in public school classrooms by sectarian teachers, were 
132. Id. at 511. 
133. Id. at 513. 
134. 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U S .  877 (1977). 
135. Id. at 8, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 46. 
136. Id. at 13-14, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 50. 
137. Id. at 14, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 51. For a discussion of controversies over religious 
clubs in other jurisdictions, although there are no reported cases at this writing, see 
ADVOCATE, Spring 1978, at 1 , 3  (published by the Christian Legal Society, Oak Park, Ill.). 
138. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
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unconstitutional. Students whose parents did not request they 
attend the religion classes spent that time on secular studies in 
another classroom. Four years later, however, in Zorach v. 
C l a u ~ o n , ' ~ ~  the Court upheld a program in which the public 
schools released for a school period those students whose parents 
so requested, so that the students could go to churches or church 
schools for religious classes. 
The McCollun and 3orach programs are distinguishable on 
two grounds. Of lesser importance, the instruction invalidated in 
McCollum was held on the public school premises while the in- 
struction upheld in Zorach was given in private facilities. But it 
is doubtful this mechanical distinction is sufficient to account for 
the difference in result. Rather, the second and more basic dis- 
tinction is that in McCollum there was a degree of sponsorship 
by the public authoritiesI4O and of implicit coercionI4l that was 
lacking in Zorach. 
In Zorach, the Court emphasized the desirability of accom- 
modation between government and religion. Justice Douglas, 
speaking for the Court, warned that if "separation of Church and 
State means that public institutions can make no adjustments of 
their schedules to accommodate the religious needs of the peo- 
ple," it would reflect "a philosophy of hostility to religion."I4* 
Although the court in Huntington Beach concluded that the rec- 
ognition of the religious club "goes far beyond the accommoda- 
tion endorsed in Z~rach , " l~~  there is lacking in the club situation 
the sort of official sanction that was involved in M c C ~ l l u m . ~ ~ ~  
The other two cases in which the Supreme Court has ruled 
definitively on religious exercises in the public school system are 
Engel v. Vitale, 14"nvolving the voluntary recitation by students 
of a state-composed prayer, and A bington School District v. 
Schempp,146 striking down a similar practice of Bible reading and 
recitation of the Lord's Prayer. In Engel, the Court declared that 
139. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
140. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U S .  203, 262-63 (1963) (Brennan, 
J., concurring). 
141. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. a t  212. 
142. 343 U.S. a t  315. 
143. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 137 Cal. Rptr. a t  51. 
144. Justice Brennan later commented that the "deeper difference" between 
McCollum and Zorach "was that the McCollum program placed the religious instructor 
in the public school classroom in precisely the position of authority held by the regular 
teachers of secular subjects, while the Zorach program did not." Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 262 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
145. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
146. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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"each separate government in this country should stay out of the 
business of writing or sanctioning official prayers . . . ."147 In 
both Engel and Schempp, the religious activity was carried out 
during regular classroom time and was part of the curriculum. 
Thus, those cases should not control the religious club issue. 
Likewise, the club issue does not turn on the dictum by the 
Schempp Court approving the objective study of the Bible.ltx 
Apart from the question of whether a nonjudgmental study of the 
Bible is truly objective, it is plain that study of the Bible and 
religion "as part of a secular program of ed~cation"'~%ill not 
justify recognition by school authorities of religious clubs. These 
clubs, at  least implicity, involve a measure of devotion and even 
proselytization, just as would a Young Democratic Club. 
As noted above,'" to pass the establishment clause test the 
recognition of a religious club must have a secular purpose; its 
primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and it 
must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. 
The recognition of such a club would have a secular purpose in 
the facilitation of the students' general rights of speech and asso- 
ciation. The primary effect and entanglement tests, however, in- 
volve a judgment of degree, particularly in light of the Court's 
statement that the main object of the establishment clause as a 
whole is to avoid "sponsorship, financial support and active in- 
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity."151 In a sense, 
recognition of the religious club would entail a type of school 
sponsorship of religious activity. For example, in State Board of 
Education v. Board of Education1" the New Jersey courts forbade 
a public school's practice of allowing pupils to meet voluntarily 
in the auditorium before school hours to read aloud from the 
Congressional Record the congressional chaplains' prayers open- 
ing the sessions of the House and Senate. The meeting was, in the 
eyes of the court, a prayer session.lw On the other hand, in Reed 
o. Van Hovenls4 a federal district court permitted a voluntary 
147. 370 U.S. at 435. 
148. 374 U.S. at 225; see text accompanying note 120 supra. 
149. 374 U.S. at 225. 
150. See note 116 and accompanying text supra. 
151. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 
397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
152. 108 N.J. Super. 564, 262 A.2d 21 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 
A.2d 412 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). 
153. See also Stein v.  Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.) (school district could not be 
required to permit elementary school pupils voluntarily to say a theistic grace), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965). Accord, De Spain v. De Kalb County Community School 
Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968). 
154. 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965). 
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prayer session before or after the school day. The court considered 
its acton to be "a permissible form of accommodation" and 
warned that "the public schools, as between theistic and human- 
istic religions, must carefully avoid any program of indoctrination 
in ultimate values."15" 
It would be appropriate and consistent with Supreme Court 
rulings in the establishment area to regard some theoretical viola- 
tions as de minimis. The mere recognition of a religious club 
could well fall into that category. In any event, an emphatic 
disclaimer by the school of any endorsement or support for the 
views of the participants in such a club, as for a Democratic or 
Republican club, should serve to negate any inference of sponsor- 
ship that might otherwise theoretically arise from allowing the 
club to meet during freetime in unused rooms.lJ8 A similar de 
minimis approach could be taken to the assertion that recognition 
of such a club would involve an improper expenditure of public 
funds in support of religion. If we are talking about mere use of 
an empty classroom or other rooms, there is no basis in any actual 
ruling (as opposed to judicial rhetoric) of the Supreme Court to 
find such a trivial expenditure as lighting a room which would 
otherwise be unlighted to be an establishment clause violation. 
If a religious club were allowed the use of duplicating equipment, 
clerical help, or other school facilities made available to all pri- 
vate clubs, a significant degree of financial support might emerge. 
But this must be balanced against the protection of such cornpet- 
ing rights as speech, association, and the free exercise of religion. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Meek v. Pittenger,IJ7 
The Court has broadly stated that "[nlo tax in any amount, 
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities 
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form 
they may adopt to teach or practice religion." Everson v. Board 
of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16. But it is clear that not all legisla- 
tive programs that provide indirect or incidental benefit to a 
155. Id. at 53. See also Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 
Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972). In 
Wood, the court noted that "[alny use of public tax monies in connection with the 
invocation and benediction appears to be de minimus." 342 F. Supp. a t  1295. 
156. See Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 980 (N.D. Miss. 1969). A New York 
county court upheld a public school board's granting of permission to a group of citizens 
to erect a Nativity creche "upon a small portion of spacious school grounds . . . during a 
period of the Christmas Holidays, when school was not in session and without any involve- 
ment of the school personnel or school district's expense." The court regarded the permis- 
sion as "merely a passive accommodation of religion." Lawrence v. Buchmueller, 40 Misc. 
2d 300, 302-03, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90-91 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
157. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
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religious institution are prohibited by the Constitution. . . . 
"The problem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one 
of degree." Zorach v. Clauson, [343 U.S. 3061, a t  314.i5n 
Essentially, the establishment clause is ancillary to the free 
exercise clause, that is, "the central value embodied in the First 
Amendment-and, more particularly, in the guarantee of 
'liberty' contained in the Fourteenth-is the safeguarding of an 
individual's right to free exercise of his religion."lN As the Su- 
preme Court noted in Sherbert v. Verner,lsO when a free exercise 
claim is involved "'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para- 
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."'lM Al- 
though the case did not involve a regulation of religious conduct, 
but rather a claim of exemption from a general prerequisite for a 
public subsidy,'" the preferred position of the free exercise clause 
indicated in Sherbert is relevant to the issue of the Bible club. It 
is difficult to envision any state interest sufficiently compelling 
to require that the petitioning students be denied, on account of 
their religion, the benefit of club recognition made available to 
others. If the school were to recognize no clubs, which would be 
within its prerogative, the religiously oriented students would 
have no sufficient claim to an exemption from that general prohi- 
bition. But if some clubs are allowed and theirs is prohibited 
solely on account of its religious character, the result would seem 
in conflict with the basic free exercise principle enunciated in 
Everson v. Board of Education163 that the state "cannot exclude 
individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, 
Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any 
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the 
benefits of public welfare legislation."'" The abstract principles 
of establishment clause cases ought not to outweigh this basic 
rule of fairness. Nor is it tenable to say that denial of recognition 
is necessary to avoid "student divisiveness in matters of religious 
158. Id. at  359 (other citations omitted). See also Smith v. Smith, 523 F.2d 121 (4th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 806 (1976) (upholding a released time program in reliance 
on Zorach and Meek). 
159. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 312 (1963) (Stewart, J., dis- 
senting). 
160. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
161. Id. at  406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
162. See Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1139-42 (1973), 
where the author comments that "subject to change without notice, free exercise has 
become the favored child of the First Amendment." Id. at 1142. 
163. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
164. Id. a t  16 (emphasis in original). 
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beliefs."16J An artifically imposed tranquility, achieved a t  the cost 
of muzzling the sincerely and peaceably held opinions of some, 
can hardly be the objective of the first amendment. Indeed, the 
muzzling of religious opinions, while other views are given free 
play, would seem likely to increase rather than reduce religious 
divisiveness. 
Denial of recognition to a religious club would also seem to 
conflict with the students' rights of free speech and association. 
In Garvin u. R ~ s e n a u * ~ ~  the court held that where a public high 
school permitted an ecology club and other groups, the district 
court should not have dismissed the complaint of students who 
sought to form a student mobilization committee as a club to 
express their views on the Vietnam War. The school policy for- 
bade clubs, such as the Young Republicans and Young Demo- 
crats, that supported "one point of view."167 Similarly, in Wood 
v. D a v i ~ o n , ~ ~ ~  the court found an infringement of students' first 
amendment rights in the denial of school facilities to a student 
Committee on Gay Educaton, a group promoting homosexual 
rights.ldg In Healy v. James170 the Supreme Court held that a state 
college could not deny recognition to a student chapter of Stu- 
dents for a Democratic Society in the absence of a showing that 
the group refused to comply with reasonable campus regulations 
so as to pose "a substantial threat of material disruption."I7l The 
Court in Healy rejected the view that "First Amendment protec- 
tions should apply with less force on college campuses than in the 
community at  large ."IT2 
The denial of recognition to a Bible club would clearly be 
based on the content of the communications the members sought 
to make among themselves. Unless the content of such communi- 
cations tends to disrupt the school, it ought not to be prohibited 
because it is religious when other types of organizations are recog- 
165. Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 
137 Cal. Rptr. at  51. In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court warned against 
"political fragmentation and division along religious lines." Id. a t  372. 
166. 455 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972). 
167. Id. at 235. 
168. 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972). 
169. See also ACLU v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970). 
170. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
171. Id. at 189. 
172. Id. at 180; see also Hudson v. Harris, 478 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1973). In Gay 
Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974), the court said "'it is immaterial 
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, 
religious or cultural matters.' " Id. at 660 (emphasis added) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). 
8471 PUBLIC EDUCATION 881 
n i ~ e d . ' ~ ~  Furthermore, denial of recognition is a form of prior re- 
straint of speech.174 The Supreme Court has said that "[alny 
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bear- 
ing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."175 
Even if disorder is a possibility, the preferred remedy in the 
religious club situation should be "subsequent punishment" 
rather than prior re~traint."~ 
Recognition of a religious club could also draw support from 
the first amendment right of reasonable access to a public forum 
for the propagation of one's views."' The theory is that 
"government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose 
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express 
less favored or more controversial views."178 Although a public 
building may be used for the expression of ideas and even for 
peaceful protest,179 a specialized place such as a school or a jail- 
house may be legitimately restricted to "the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated."lgO But where the school authorities have rec- 
ognized other clubs, thus providing a forum within the school for 
clubs generally, they should have no right to deny the use of that 
forum to some members of the school community solely because 
their views are religious. 
Also involved in the religious club matter is the right to hear, 
that is, the right to receive information.lg1 The rights of prospec- 
tive as well as present club members and of the passive bulk of 
the student body could be analyzed under this heading?' There 
173. It is well established that "above all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content." Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
174. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
175. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
176. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,294-95 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 
147, 162 (1939). 
177. See National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Niemotko 
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 258 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 
334 U.S. 558 (1948); Love11 v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
178. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); see also Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
179. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
180. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966); see also Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. 
Supp. 963, 969-70 (N.D. Miss. 1969). 
181. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well established that 
the Constitution protects the right to receive information or ideas."); Lamont v. Postmas- 
ter Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. Struthen, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943); Minarcini 
v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Comment, The Right to 
Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 
GEO. L.J. 775, 779-89 (1975). 
182. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977). 
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is a positive value in maintaining the channels of communication 
among students.lU3 Whether the religious club issue is considered 
from the point of view of the prospective speakers or hearers,'" 
the dispositive fact issue will be the same: whether there exists a 
sufficiently compelling govermental interest to justify the 
abridgement of a first amendment right. 
The encouragement of extracurricular religious clubs would 
seem to be within the rights of the objecting Christian parents 
with whom this Article is concerned, the Huntington Beach deci- 
sion notwithstanding. Such clubs would appear to offer signifi- 
cant opportunities for study and, to a limited extent, proselytiza- 
tion. However, in light of the cosmic concerns expressed by some 
parents, the formation of religious clubs in the public schools 
would be only a fragmentary remedy for the problems they pro- 
fess to see. The ultimate remedy for those parents is the establish- 
ment of their own schools. 
D. The Independent Christian School 
"The essence of education is that it  be religious," wrote 
Alfred North Whitehead.'" The current Supreme Court defini- 
tion of religion, embracing not only theism but all shadings of 
atheism and agnosticism as well, makes the accuracy of White- 
head's remark apparent. Until recently, the legitimacy of reli- 
gious influence in education, whether public or private, was ac- 
knowledged throughout our history. Even today, there is an air 
of unrealism in the pretense that the secular public school is au- 
thentically areligious. Justice Jackson, in his Everson dissent, 
properly observed- that the public school "is organized on the 
premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious 
-- - - -  - - 
183. In Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748 (1976), the Court said, in striking down a prohibition against the advertisement of 
prescription prices, 
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic aproach. That 
alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people 
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and 
that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather 
than to close them. 
Id. a t  770. 
184. Incidentally, the right to form a religious club also would seem to include the 
right of the members to invite outside speakers onto the campus, a t  least where other 
student clubs are allowed to invite outside speakers to address them. Similarly, a public 
school teacher would seem to be protected by the concept of academic freedom if he 
chooses to invite religious speakers, among others, to address his classes where such is 
relevant to the subject matter of his course. Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. 
Or. 1976). 
185. A. WHITEHEAD, THE AIMS OF EDUCATION 25 (1929). 
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teaching. . . . The assumption is that after the individual has 
been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to 
choose his religion."'" But that stance of the public school can 
hardly be described as anything but itself a religious position. It 
affirms the separability of religion from secular life, which is 
nothing less than an affirmation of at least the partial irrelevancy 
of God's law to the world He created. An adequate examination 
of this question, of course, would require much more than a law 
review article. What we can safely say, however,' is that the differ- 
ences of the militant Christian parents with the public school are 
so fundamental that no cosmetic remedy will resolve the conflict. 
The parents' position ultimately tends to be that public elemen- 
tary and secondary education itself is a violation of the religious 
neutrality required by the establishment clause. It is not neces- 
sary, however, to prove that contention in order to justify an 
adequate remedy for the objecting parents. Their position is es- 
sentially defensive. They seek not to dismantle the public schools 
but to educate their own children according to God's law as they 
see it. The palliative remedies discussed above would not suffice 
even if they were available through the courts. Rather, the par- 
ents' contention, and the point of this Article, is that they ought 
to be allowed to go their own way. 
The constitutionality of compulsory attendance laws is well 
established; the state may properly require parents to place their 
children in a school or otherwise to provide them with equivalent 
instruction.ln7 The state may not, however, require that all chil- 
dren attend public scho01s.l~~ Nevertheless, the constitutional 
right to educate one's children in private schools does not confer 
on those schools a constitutional immunity from reasonable state 
regulation to determine the adequacy of the education provided 
in them. Likewise, when a parent undertakes to educate his child 
--- 
186. 330 U.S. a t  23-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
187. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Parr v. State,. 117 Ohio St. 
23, 157 N.E. 555 (1927). See generally E. BOLMEIER, THE SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 
(i 16.6 (1973). 
188. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union 
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not 
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations. 
Id. a t  535. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court struck down a statute 
prohibiting instruction in any school, public or nonpublic, in any language other than the 
English language, See also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
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at home rather than in a school of any sort, he is subject to the 
power of the state to ensure that the education provided at home 
is equivalent to that provided in a public or private school.lm 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has refused to raise private tutor- 
ing to the same constitutional level as education in a private 
"school . "lgo Thus, under the prevailing interpretations, the state 
may, pursuant to its police power, constitutionally require that 
all children attend some school, whether public or private. There- 
fore, when the states do permit equivalent instruction at home, 
they do so as an exercise of legislative grace and not as a matter 
of constitutional duty.lgl 
While the claim by parents of the right to educate their chil- 
dren at home is peripheral to the Christian school controversy 
with which this Article is concerned, some principles developed 
in the home teaching cases have a significant impact on formally 
organized private schools. Where permitted, such home instruc- 
tion must comply with reasonable state standards of equiva- 
lency.lB2 Among other measures to ensure the equivalency of 
home instruction, the state may properly require, under the de- 
cided cases, that the parent or other instructor be a teacher certi- 
fied by the state.lg3 On the other hand, equivalency of the physical 
189. See T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973); Rice v. Commonwealth, 
118 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948); Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1975); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 
1401 (1949). 
In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Supreme Court said, 
Since Pierce, a substantial body of case law has confirmed the powers of the 
States to insist that attendance a t  private schools, if i t  is to satisfy state 
compulsory-attendance laws, be at  institutions which provide minimum hours 
of instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed sub- 
jects of instruction. Indeed, the State's interest in assuring that these standards 
are being met has been considered a sufficient reason for refusing to accept 
instruction at home as compliance with compulsory education statutes. These 
cases were a sensible corollary of Pierce u. Society of Sisters: if the State must 
satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument of private 
schools, i t  has a proper interest in the manner in which those schools perform 
their secular educational function. 
Id. a t  245-47 (footnotes omitted). 
190. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
191. See Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
192. See State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County Ct. L. Div. 
1967) (permitting education at  home on a showing of equivalency of academic content). 
But in Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937), 
the court was of the opinion that in view of the role of education in developing citizenship, 
"it is almost impossible for a child to be adequately taught in his home. I cannot conceive 
how a child can receive in the home instruction and experiences in group activity and in 
social outlook in any manner or form comparable to that provided in the public school." 
Id. a t  92, 189 A. a t  137. 
193. See State v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied, 
363 U.S. 814 (1960); Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948). 
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facilities to those of the public schools seems not to be required.lQ4 
In Wisconsin u. Yoder,lB5 in which the Court ruled that the 
state had no sufficient compelling interest to justify application 
of a compulsory attendance law to Amish parents who refused to 
send their children to high school, the Court recognized "the 
State's interest in universal compulsory education," but said that 
"only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise 
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of 
religion."lM Application of this standard was involved in State u. 
Whisner. In Whisner, parents of students attending the Taber- 
nacle Christian School, together with the school's principal, Rev- 
erend Levi Whisner, resisted the application to that school of the 
minimum standards established by the Ohio State Board of Edu- 
cation. At the Tabernacle Christian School, the only teacher was 
certified in Ohio as well as three other states. The course of study 
required by the school included mathematics, spelling, English, 
social studies, history, civics, science, reading, art, music, and 
physical education. The students at the school registered superior 
marks on the Stanford Achievement Test. The school was in ses- 
sion six hours per day for 180 days per year. The daily atten- 
dance was reported to public officials and the school admitted 
public officials for the purpose of making health, safety, and fire 
inspections. The governing statute, however, required that every 
child "attend a school which conforms to the minimum standards 
prescribed by the state board of education."lQ8 The parents and 
Reverend Whisner were convicted of violating this statute. On 
appeal, however, the convictions were unanimously reversed by 
the Ohio Supreme Court. 
The 0hio minimum standards were held to violate the defen- 
dants' free exercise of religion in several respects. The minimum 
standards provided, "a charter shall be granted after an inspec- 
tion which determines that all standards have been met."1QQ The 
court said that "such absolute compliance" was not required by 
the governing  statute^.^^ One standard allocated instructional 
time for state-prescribed subjects "which, by their very nature, 
194. See State v. LaBarge, 134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121 (1976). On compulsory atten- 
dance requirements generally, see In re McMillan, 30 N .C. App. 235, 237,226 S .E.2d 693, 
695 (1976); Commonwealth v. Ross, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 105, 330 A.2d 290 (1975); [I9771 
Y.B. SCH. L. 116-20 (Piele ed.); [I9761 Y.B. SCH. L. 88-92 (Piele ed.). 
195. 406 U S .  205 (1W2). 
196. Id. at 215. 
197. 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). 
198. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 8 3321.03 (Page 1972). 
199. 47 Ohio St. 2d at 201, 351 N.E.2d at 762 (emphasis added). 
200. Id. at 205, 351 N.E.2d at 764. 
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may not easily lend themselves to the teaching of religious princi- 
ples (e.g., mathernatic~)."~~1 The court ruled this was a violation 
of the free exercise of religion because it failed to leave sufficient 
uncommitted time in the school day for a private school to use 
for religious training or such other instruction or activity as it 
might deem appropriate.202 
Another minimum standard held to violate the defendants' 
free exercise of religion was the mandate that "all activities" of 
a nonpublic school "conform to policies adopted by the [state] 
board of education."203 "All activities" of a religious school, of 
necessity, must include religious activities. The court considered 
it unconstitutional, under the establishment clause, to require 
such religious activities "to conform to the policies of a purport- 
edly 'neutral' board."204 
Finally, the court held unconstitutional the following stan- 
dard: "Efforts toward providing quality education by the school 
for the community it serves shall be achieved through cooperation 
and interaction between the school and the community. The un- 
derstanding of the roles of each and a flow of information are 
basic to this relation~hip."~~~ Since the religion of the defendants 
required them "to engage in complete, or nearly complete, sepa- 
ration from community affairs,"2M and since the court interpreted 
this standard to require interaction between the school and the 
general community rather than between the school and the lim- 
ited religious community it serves, the court concluded that this 
requirement of interaction was an infringement of the defendants' 
free exercise of religion.207 
Significantly, $he prosecutor in the trial of the Whisner case 
objected to the introduction of the Stanford Achievement Test 
scores of the Tabernacle Christian students as "irrelevant and 
immaterial."20s Apparently, the state took the position that com- 
pliance with the minimum standards was indispensable to an 
adequate education. 
The Whisner case is not conclusive on the right of indepen- 
dent Christian schools to exist. The Ohio minimum standards 
201. Id. at 207, 351 N.E.2d at 765. 
202. See id. 
203. Id. at 201, 351 N.E.2d at 762. 
204. Id. at 207, 351 N.E.2d at 766. 
205. Id. at 201, 351 N.E.2d at 762. 
206. Id. at 209, 351 N.E.2d at 767. 
207. Id. at 209-10, 351 N.E.2d at 767. 
208. A. GROVER, supra note 34, at 5 , 6  (1977) (quoting Transcript of Testimony at 282, 
State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1970)). 
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were self-contradictory in major respects and were extreme in 
their effort to achieve equivalency of public and private educa- 
tion. The refusal of the parents and Reverend Whisner to comply 
with any state regulation except health, safety, and fire rules and 
those requiring attendance reports is a common tactic among 
supporters of Christian schools.2w When the decisive case comes, 
it  will involve the refusal of an efficient and well-established 
school to submit to moderate and conciliatory state regulations. 
The case law, or at least dicta, would seem to support the imposi- 
tion of such standards by the states.210 The issue, however, cannot 
be said to be closed. 
If the state's interest is in promoting literacy and civic com- 
petence among the citizenry, it is not clear that education in 
public schools is an indispensable means to the accomplishment 
of that end. And it is difficult to see how private, church-related 
schools can properly be regarded as so inadequate that they can- 
not do the job without state supervision over the content and 
method of their instruction and the certification of their teachers. 
It is not merely an exercise of post hoc, ergo propter hoc to note 
that the dominance of public education has not exactly brought 
about an increase in either the literacy or the civic competence 
of its beneficiaries. "Average scores on the Scholastic Aptitude 
Test have been declining for more than a decade, and the Na- 
tional Assessment of Educational Progress, financed by the Fed- 
eral Government, estimates that 13 percent of the nations's 17- 
year-old high school students are functionally illiterate."211 It is 
worth considering that The Federalist Papers were published in 
the popular press and were written for the average, church-school 
educated citizen in New York. One may speculate as to how many 
high school seniors could read them intelligently today. 
I t  would be useful to consider here the principle that 
"reasonable and adequate alternatives" should be used in prefer- 
ence to greater restrictions on constitutional rights? Thus, the 
Court in Yoder said "only those interests of the highest order and 
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to 
the free exercise of religion."213 It would seem reasonable for a 
209. See N.Y. Times, June 20, 1978, at A14, col. 2. 
210. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968). The Supreme Court 
has said: "There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for 
education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of 
basic education." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U S .  205, 213 (1972). 
211. Fiske, Controversy Is Crowing Over Basic Academic Competency of Students, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1978, at B4, cols. 1,2. 
212. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
213. 406 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added). 
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state to require, in addition to reasonable fire, safety, and health 
regulations, merely that a school be such that its students are 
required to be in attendance for the same number of days as are 
required for public school students. This would eliminate any 
state control over content or method of teaching and qualifica- 
tions of teachers. It would depend, however, on the presumption 
that any student in regular attendance at any organized school 
will be as well educated as he would be in a public school. In view 
of the recent track record of public education, this presumption 
could become very strong indeed. 
